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The contemporary industrial metabolism is not sustainable. Critical
problems arise at both the input and the output side of the com-
plex: Although affordable fossil fuels and mineral resources are
declining, the waste products of the current production and con-
sumption schemes (especially CO2 emissions, particulate air pollu-
tion, and radioactive residua) cause increasing environmental and
social costs. Most challenges are associated with the incumbent
energy economy that is unlikely to subsist. However, the crucial
question is whether a swift transition to its sustainable alternative,
based on renewable sources, can be achieved. The answer requires
a deep analysis of the structural conditions responsible for the rigid-
ity of the fossil-nuclear energy system. We argue that the resilience
of the fossil-nuclear energy system results mainly from a dynamic
lock-in pattern known in operations research as the “Success to the
Successful” mode. The present way of generating, distributing,
and consuming energy—the largest business on Earth—expands
through a combination of factors such as the longevity of pertinent
infrastructure, the information technology revolution, the growth
of the global population, and even the recent ﬁnancial crises: Re-
newable-energy industries evidently suffer more than the conven-
tional-energy industries under recession conditions. Our study tries
to elucidate the archetypical traits of the lock-in pattern and to
assess the respective importance of the factors involved. In par-
ticular, we identify modern corporate law as a crucial system
element that thus far has been largely ignored. Our analysis
indicates that the rigidity of the existing energy economy would
be reduced considerably by the assignment of unlimited liabili-
ties to the shareholders.
“Whoever has in his hand, to him will be given and whoever has not,
even the little he has, will be taken from him.”
—The Gospel of Thomas, Logos 41.*
The incumbent energy system generates a number of negativeeffects, many of which disturb the climate and threaten the
ecosystems on which we depend. Although those effects have been
known for several decades, and although sustainability is a widely
held aspiration, there has been no real mitigation of the most
pertinent causes: the generation and use of conventional energy
sources. In fact, although the combined share of fossil and nuclear
resources in the world’s total supply of primary energy has re-
mained stable since 1973, the absolute supply of these resources
hasmore than doubled. In parallel with this increase, shareholders’
power in the realm of corporate governance has increased
signiﬁcantly.
This paper discusses and characterizes the structural mecha-
nisms behind the rigidity of the contemporary energy system and
considers the role of corporate law in this context. It concludes
with a suggestion for a change in the structure of corporate law
that may help reduce our energy system’s addiction to fossil
energy resources and the negative side-effects of this addiction.
Problems Caused by the Current Energy System
The generation of energy for industry and consumers has multiple
negative side-effects; among others are precarious amounts of
CO2 emissions; pollution of air, land, and water; nuclear waste;
geopolitical conﬂicts; looming shortages of certain energy reserves;
and rising food prices.Most of these problems have been known for
ﬁve decades (2, 3). An updated integrated assessment is given by
the German Advisory Council on Global Change (WBGU) in its
latest report, which spells out the necessity of transformational
change within the next 10–20 y (4).
Indeed, public and political awareness of the problematic
impacts of fossil and nuclear energy use has grown since the 1970s.
Treaties, regulations, and laws have been established to combat
these impacts at national and international levels. Since the early
1990s, and accelerating in the early to mid-2000s, policies to pro-
mote energy and technology without signiﬁcant negative side-
effects (see the discussion of alternative energy technologies, be-
low) have grown substantially in number (5). However, in the same
period there has been no meaningful relative decline in the ex-
ploitation of conventional energy sources. In absolute terms, the
world’s supply of energy from primary, conventional sources has
more than doubled since 1973.
Evolution of the Energy System Since the 1970s
The negative effects of the generation and use of energy are best
described by splitting the global energy system (“the energy
system”) into two subsystems: a conventional system with energy
sources (and associated technologies) that generate problems and
an alternative system with energy sources (and technologies) that
do not. These subsystems’ sources and technologies are discerned
on the basis of (i) their environmental implications (e.g., air, land, or
water pollution; CO2 emissions; nuclear waste generation); (ii) the
Signiﬁcance
Energy systems based on fossil fuels and uranium have brought
about modernity and its speciﬁc agro-industrial metabolism.
Although this achievement creates a deep lock-in effect, col-
lateral damages such as climate change and large-scale con-
tamination cast doubts on the sustainability of the current
mode of global socioeconomic operation. This article analyzes
why the incumbent energy systems are so rigid and still out-
compete their more sustainable rivals. We elucidate the role of
contemporary corporate law in this context and argue that the
stiffness of current energy systems could be overcome by
assigning unlimited responsibilities to shareholders.
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*The essential difference with the commonly used Matthew effect (i.e., “the rich get
richer and the poor get poorer”) lies in the wording “in his hand.” Quispel (1) explains
that at the time of writing of the Gospel of Thomas the phrase “to have in your hand”
had a particular meaning in Coptic: that one was willing to give away, to let go of what
one possessed. The Matthew effect represents unlimited, runaway growth or decline,
whereas the statement from the Gospel of Thomas incorporates stabilizing behavior,
which, if not used, will be succeeded by runaway decline.
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ﬁniteness of their availability; (iii) the geopolitical stress accompa-
nying their extraction and trading; and (iv) (speciﬁcally for biofuels)
their impact on the availability of crop land and food prices.
Conventional Energy System. Following the above distinction, the
conventional energy system comprises oil, coal, natural gas, uranium,
and biofuels as energy input and, among others, coal gasiﬁcation,
cracking, and reﬁning, and CO2 sequestration as technologies. Fig. 1
provides a dynamic perspective, showing that in 2010 oil (32.4%),
coal (27.3%), natural gas (21.4%), and nuclear (5.7%) jointly
accounted for 86.8% of the world’s total primary energy supply
(“TPES”) (6). Biofuels were excluded from this list because the
International Energy Agency (IEA) in its 2012 World Energy
Statistics does not differentiate percentage-wise among solid
biofuels and animal products, gas/liquids from biofuels, industrial
waste, and municipal waste, all of which have different effects on
the availability of cropland and food prices. If biofuels had been
included in the calculation, the overall percentage of energy from
conventional sources would be signiﬁcantly higher than 86.8%.
According to the IEA, in 1973 conventional energy, excluding
biofuels, accounted for 87.6% of world TPES. [We use the year
1973 here (instead of 1971, the ﬁrst year in Fig. 1) because the
IEA uses 1973 as the ﬁrst year in its break-down of fuel shares of
the TPES in its Key World Energy Statistics (6).] In absolute
terms, global TPES (conventional and alternative combined)
rose from 6,107 million tons of oil equivalent (“Mtoe”) in 1973
to 12,717 Mtoe in 2010. Thus the market share of world TPES
for oil, coal, natural gas, and nuclear energy was relatively stable
(with a 0.8% decrease) in this period, but the absolute total
supply increased by 106.3%.
Thus, despite the negative side-effects of the conventional en-
ergy system and the widespread calls for sustainability, the con-
ventional primary energy supply more than doubled.
Alternative Energy System. The alternative energy system com-
prises solar, wind, geothermal, and hydro energy; among its as-
sociated technologies are concentrated solar technology and wind
turbines. This system generates (almost) no air, land, or water
pollution and no CO2 emissions; it is abundant in terms of sun,
wind, geothermal heat, and water; minimal geopolitical stress is
caused by its production; and it exerts no inﬂuence on world food
prices. This is not to say that the alternative system will not generate
serious problems in the long term, but it is safe to say that at present
its energy technologies have the ability to mitigate the energy sys-
tem’s current problems.
If we also add a dynamical perspective here, then in 2010, as
shown in Fig. 1, solar, wind, geothermal, heat (jointly 0.9%, shown as
”other’ in Fig. 1) and hydro energy (2.3%) made up 3.2% of the
global TPES. In 1973 these resources together represented 1.9% of
the world’s TPES—a growth of 1.3% over 37 y. A comparison of
these numbers and those of conventional energy leads to the in-
escapable conclusion that, in absolute numbers, the growth in alter-
native energy supply is entirely overmatched by the growth in the
conventional energy supply. Moreover, the IEA (7) records that,
because of the ﬁnancial crisis, investment in renewables-based
power generation dropped relatively more than investment in other
kinds of energy generation capacity in late 2008 and early 2009.
Without governmental ﬁscal incentives, it would have decreased by
almost 30%.
Explanation and Characterization of Growth and Rigidity
On the basis of IEA research spanning the last 3.5 decades, the
development of global TPES suggests that there is considerable
rigidity, if not stasis, in the energy market (8, 9). Because of
growing energy demand, the conventional energy system has
expanded its supply gradually since 1973, thereby also increasing
its environmental effects. The traits of a rigid but growing market
can be summed up as a relatively stable division of market shares
and a substantial growth of the entire market. These traits and
their underlying behavioral structures are explained below.
The conventional and alternative energy subsystems exhibit
similar behavioral structures, because both operate by the same
basic mechanisms—positive or reinforcing feedback loops, also
known in economics as “increasing returns.” The basic positive
feedback loop at the core of both subsystems is the following: To
create appropriate technology, large investments in research and
development (R&D), demonstration, testing, and equipment are
needed. Generally speaking, the higher the investments, the better
are the results. Thus, increased investments lead to improved
R&D, superior demonstration and testing processes, better equip-
ment, and ﬁnally, to improved production and products. The higher
the quality of the product—assuming appropriate support by
marketing and sales—the more products will be sold. When more
products are sold, there is more feedback from the market,
leading to better product quality and greater proﬁts. Proﬁts then
can be reinvested to increase both the quality of equipment (e.g.,
to lower production costs) and the level of R&D, demonstration,
testing, marketing, and sales. Fig. 2 depicts a causal loop diagram
of this process.
Once this wheel is turning, the company or industry operating it
can increase its proﬁts and lower its costs, leading to increasing
returns (10). Companies or industries that do not manage to create
Fig. 1. World TPES from 1971–2010 (6). Image courtesy of Key World En-
ergy Statistics 2012 © OECD/IEA, 2012, p 6.
Fig. 2. Core reinforcing feedback loop in technology.
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ormaintain this cycle for either strategic orﬁnancial reasons usually
will not remain very long in the market.
Increasing returns, i.e., a state in which a process output grows
more than proportionately to the increase in inputs, are particularly
common in technology-driven industries (11). The very fact that
technology has been profoundly involved in the generation and
consumption of energy since the ﬁrst Industrial Revolution ex-
plains the widespread presence of increasing returns and hence
their characteristics—multiple equilibria, path dependence, lock-in
(rigidity), and possible inefﬁciency (12)—in the energy system (13).
We now look brieﬂy for the presence of increasing returns in the
energy system by identifying their sources. Sources of increasing
returns are large set-up or ﬁxed costs, learning effects, coordi-
nation effects, and self-reinforcing expectations (12). To generate
energy, capital-intensive technology is required at every stage of
extraction (oil drilling rigs and platforms), processing (oil re-
ﬁneries, coal-ﬁred power plants, solar cell production plants),
transport (intercontinental pipelines, liqueﬁed natural gas super-
tankers), and delivery (gas station networks, electricity grids), all
of which have large and ﬁxed set-up costs. The production and use
of technology products and the production of energy generate
feedbacks from the production process (e.g., defects in a test
production line of solar cells) and from users (customer com-
plaints about noisy wind turbines); these feedbacks can be used to
improve the production process and the products themselves
(learning effects). Moreover, once customers have purchased
a particular technology (e.g., a car with a combustion engine) that
uses a certain type of energy (e.g., gasoline or diesel), they and
future customers are inclined, or even obliged, to purchase a
product using the same technology and associated energy, because
there already is a network (e.g., of gas stations) in place to facilitate
the use of that particular technology and energy (coordination/
network effects). The ensuing prevalence of a certain energy-
technology complex (such as the combustion engine car and
a network of gas stations) then is reinforced by the belief of con-
sumers, producers, and investors that that type of technology and
energy will become even more dominant in the transportation
market (self-reinforcing expectations).
Companies and industries in both the conventional and alter-
native energy systems fundamentally operate the cycle portrayed
in Fig. 2. However, the conventional system has been in place
successfully for a longer period of time, and during that period
competition for the adoption of technologies by consumers has
occurred, for example, among the steam engine, the (electric car)
battery, and the combustion engine. Thus, the technology and
products of the conventional energy system obviously have built
up hardware infrastructures, know-how, and goodwill. The alter-
native energy system lacks this historically accumulated position.
Although both subsystems operate under increasing returns and
compete for ﬁnancial investment capital and the adoption of their
technologies by consumers (among other things), the relationship
between the conventional and the alternative energy system
resembles the systems dynamics archetype of “Success to the
Successful” (14). A diagram of this simple but generic and pow-
erful systems-confrontation process is given in Fig. 3.
The archetype and its behavior, described by Senge (15) and
Braun (16), represent a speciﬁc mechanism of increasing returns.
The mechanism underlying this archetype is one in which
resources are allocated to a party in reward for (initially small)
success, resulting in the creation of more success. Because these
resources are not allocated to another competing party, a com-
petitor has limited chances of success. It is evident that this
mechanism may function as a powerful barrier to change. It
initially has multiple equilibria (any competing party could be the
ﬁrst to have the resources allocated), but path dependence
(success propagates success, and failure propagates failure)
eventually generates lock-in and rigidity. Once a fairly consistent
allocation to either A or B has been made over a sufﬁciently long
a period, changing the allocation is virtually impossible because the
system has become inﬂexible and unresponsive to changes in its
environment. As Braun (16) notes, “[being] bogged down in this
archetype can also lead to the erosion of innovation and change.”
There also is a psychological dimension to industrial lock-in: Pri-
vate investors and fund managers, in particular, seem to have sig-
niﬁcant reluctance to direct ﬁnancial ﬂuxes toward emerging, highly
innovative business cases, even if a superior return–risk relationship
can be demonstrated for these cases. In practice, the “unfamiliarity
gap” proves to be a powerful obstacle to systems transformation.
An example of the “Success to the Successful” paradigm out-
side the realm of energy and technology is a neuropsychological
process in the brain described by Hebb’s Law (17). The more the
connections between the neurons in our brain are stimulated, the
more powerful they become, thereby facilitating the capacity for
repetition of the same stimulus. This stimulus takes place to the
exclusion of the activation of other available connections. When
the brain starts to develop, the stimulus “makes a choice” among
the multiple available connections. This choice is determined by
initially minute and stochastic differences among the available
options. Later, this self-created heightened capacity functions like
a magnet for the stimulus. As time passes, the stimulus more and
more automatically takes the path it has taken before: It no
longer is naturally inclined to explore alternative available con-
nections which, not having been used, become redundant and
disappear, and the old connections between the neurons ulti-
mately die. If neurons are rarely stimulated or not stimulated at
all, they lose their synapses (“synaptic pruning”). In this process
the neurons that are not needed currently are returned to a so-
called “uncommitted state” to support possible future development
(18). In other words, the repetitive experience of certain phe-
nomena increases the sensitivity of the brain to re-experience
these same phenomena. After a certain period of time the brain
can become addicted to speciﬁc observations and impressions to
the exclusion of alternatives.
The behavioral mechanisms of “Success to the Successful” also
surface in the energy system, for example, in the history and
current conﬁguration of the conventional energy system. The
internal combustion engine currently is the dominant technology
that propels cars, and its former competitors, the battery (for the
electric car) and the steam engine, have practically disappeared
from the market. Despite several attempts at large-scale rein-
troduction of the electric car (19), the market presence of this
vehicle genus remains marginal, and its future is still uncertain
because of rigidity in the automobile business (20, 21).
In contrast, when the automobile industry was born in the
1890s, it was a completely open-ended story. The battery, the
steam engine, and the combustion motor were all candidates to
become the most successful technology in the car market. There
are a host of strongly varying reasons—not conﬁned to economic or
technological relevance, let alone supremacy—why the combustionFig. 3. The “Success to the Successful” archetype.
Dangerman and Schellnhuber PNAS | Published online January 7, 2013 | E551
SU
ST
A
IN
A
BI
LI
TY
SC
IE
N
CE
PN
A
S
PL
U
S
SE
E
CO
M
M
EN
TA
RY
engine gained the initial advantages vis-à-vis its competitors that
eventually resulted in its market conquest (i.e., the collapse of the
multiple-equilibria phase).
An interesting anecdote in this context is the experience of the
American Stanley brothers who, in the late 1890s and early 1900s,
developed steam cars that functioned just as well as, if not better
than, combustion-propelled cars and that, for several years, went
faster. The Stanley brothers offered a promising and highly com-
petitive technology but made a fatal mistake by refusing to mass
produce cars. In the early phase of the competition between the
various car-engine options, this refusal played an important neg-
ative role in the proliferation of steam technology (21, 22).
Another enlightening example is given by Cowan and Hulten
(22) regarding the introduction of small batteries for starting the
automobile and for lighting and ignition, which had just been
introduced to gasoline cars. As sales of these new, small batteries
took off, there was a corresponding decline in the building of
capacities needed for developing advanced batteries that would
have enhanced the driving range of electric cars considerably.
R&D strategies and investments by battery producers henceforth
were focused on the mass production of small batteries that
would get a car going but not keep it running.
The more money, energy, and human resources were invested in
the development of combustion-based technologies by ﬁnancial and
industrial investors, engineers, and consumers (providing useful
feedback), the more combustion-based technologies thrived (path
dependence), and the less investment was available for competing
technologies.
In parallel, as the sales of cars with combustion engines rose,
a network of gasoline stations was created, bit by bit, to supply
these cars with fuel. This process established a network effect that
increased, and currently still maintains, the rigidity in the auto-
mobile market (e.g., oil companies are not switching to building
hydrogen stations on a large scale, because they are waiting for
manufacturers to mass produce fuel-cell cars—and vice versa).
The evolution toward rigidity in evolutionary systems is cer-
tainly a prominent feature in the energy-technology market,
which is the central topic of this paper. Despite the relatively high
repelling power of that market, new technologies such as solar and
wind energy schemes are trying to enter and to claim a substantial
stake of the entire business ﬁeld. In Fig. 3, actor A (a conventional
energy-technology complex, e.g., oil and the combustion engine)
and actor B (another conventional combination, e.g., steam and
the steam turbine) have competed. A has won and claimed access
to the resources needed, which were readily provided. The linkage
between A and its access to resources has taken shape. Now actor
C (an alternative energy-technology complex, e.g., solar and wind
harvesting combined with advanced batteries for electric cars)
seeks to spin up its own positive feedback loop and ﬁghts for
access to the pertinent resources. This situation, adapted to the
parameters of the energy-technology subsystems described ear-
lier, is represented by Fig. 4.
This ﬁgure is obviously a highly stylized account of complex
reality and therefore does not represent certain other important
matters. For example, not all investments lead to purely positive
feedback loops; they also may lead to increased organizational
bureaucracy (see above). Also, when investments are made, they
usually encourage the emergence of institutions with an envi-
ronment conducive to technology diffusion (23). Furthermore, if
the perspective is shifted from supply to demand, then the loops
described above also visibly apply to technology adoptions; both
loops compete for purchase, employment, and accompanying
feedback by consumers.
However, for all its simplicity, Fig. 4 reﬂects a behavioral
structure that has major implications for how the energy sys-
tem can be biased in favor of alternative energy technology, if
need be.
The structure of the chart indicates what happens when pen-
sion funds acquire blocks of shares in oil companies or govern-
mental institutions decide to apportion subsidies to coal-related
technology (24). Because these bodies know that a good return on
their investments depends on the coal industry being successful,
such investments feed into a behavioral mechanism that eventually
not only locks in the technologies attracting and getting invest-
ments but also locks out those that do not. Policymakers aiming to
change the status quo of the energy system therefore are faced
with taking rather draconian measures, namely, not spreading
their subsidies and loans over the different energy technologies—
because doing so only reinforces the existing and dominating
positive feedback loops—but focusing on those that solve the
problems. [In the period 2007–2010, world wide, conventional
energy (excluding nuclear) received $495 billion in subsidies, and
alternative energy was subsidized with $61 billion, a ratio of 8.1: 1
(25).] The same process applies, mutatis mutandis, to lawmakers
seeking to create regulations for overcoming the energy system’s
predicaments: Problem-causing technologies should be addressed
only by prohibitive laws, and problem-relieving technologies
should be facilitated by stimulus laws. In the last section of this
paper, the link between making changes to a system that exhibits
the “Success to the Successful” pattern and international corpo-
rate law will be examined further.
The rigidity of the energy system is largely the result of its major
feedback loops and is comparable to the stability provided to
a bicycle by its spinning wheels (preservation of angular momen-
tum). Increasing returns are important drivers of technology in-
dustries and are key to explaining behavioral structures in the
Fig. 4. “Success to the Successful” competition between conventional (conv) and alternative (alt) energy technologies.
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energy system, but their presence does not explain everything. For
example, where is the exponential growth that increasing returns
suggest? And why does the alternative energy system exist at all if
the historically built up, and hence currently dominant, success of
the conventional energy system works to the detriment of its al-
ternative? These questions are important but can be considered
only brieﬂy in this paper.
Even when a positive feedback loop is available and operative
in a system, genuinely exponential growth of any kind (e.g.,
through the adoption of either the conventional or the alternative
energy system) may not happen, largely because increasing returns
always eventually hit impediments—represented by negative or
stabilizing loops—that reduce highly nonlinear growth to gradual
development or less (2, 10). These impediments can be many. For
instance, a ﬁnancial crisis and saturation of the market can limit
the demand for products; in the latter case initial exponential
growth may be followed by stabilizing of market shares and lock-in
effects. Also, rising costs caused by scarcity of energy sources or
expensive and proliferating bureaucracy can limit proﬁts and
therefore reinvestment. These factors all lead eventually to de-
cline in growth. However, as long as these negative feedback loops
and other dissipative schemes do not outweigh the positive feed-
back loops, growth will endure, albeit perhaps not exponentially.
To put these considerations in the perspective of the energy dis-
cussion above: Most of the growth in the world’s TPES today is in
non-Western countries, in the emerging economies of China,
India, and Brazil. In July, 2010, China became the largest energy
user in the world.
Moreover, the existence of the alternative energy system can be
explained by the fact that, despite the presence of a “Success to
the Successful” pattern (or perhaps because of it and the thus-
provoked political qualms), subsidies are provided to and in-
vestments made in startup companies in the alternative energy
system—even though it is not certain which of the alternative
technologies will “win” and whether the technologies in question
will be able to compete with their conventional counterparts. So
often conspicuous niches have been created for alternative tech-
nologies and energies to experiment and thrive, albeit not ones
which are truly independent of what happens in the rest of the
energy system. As shown above, it was the alternative energy
system that was hardest hit by the ﬁnancial crisis of 2008. We can
consider this situation in terms of resilience theory: Because the
technologies of the alternative energy system are still in their late-
reorganization and early-exploitation (α-r) phase and therefore
still lack the critical mass of their conventional competitors, the
alternative energy system is very prone and vulnerable to external
perturbations (26).
Panarchy in the Energy System
The concepts of adaptive cycles, panarchy, and resilience (26–28)
provide additional insight into the dynamics of the energy sys-
tem. In Fig. 5, we portray the alternative and the conventional
Fig. 5. Key relationships of the various systems visualized in a panarchy depiction.
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energy systems, together with managers’ (conventional) decision-
making behavior and the ﬁnancial and the environmental sys-
tems, in a simple panarchical depiction, i.e., in a hierarchical
representation of linked adaptive cycles. For the sake of sim-
plicity, the environmental system represents both the climate and
the earth’s ecosystems. The horizontal axis represents the size of
the system while it cycles through its respective evolutionary
phases. That size is expressed either as the space that the system
(potentially) uses to operate, or (in social systems) as the number
of people that are part of the system. The vertical axis represents
the speed with which the system evolves through its respective
cycle. The four phases of the adaptive cycle are the reorganization
(α) phase, the exploitation (r) phase, the conservation (K) phase,
and the release (Ω) phase.
In growth terms, we see that expansion of the conventional
energy system and its output produced by its generation and use
of energy have led to substantial interference with the environ-
mental system (the arrow from the conventional to the envi-
ronmental system in Fig. 5). As rapidly developing countries such
as China and India aggressively pursue the supply and use of
conventional energy, which already is severely disturbing atmo-
sphere, oceans, and biosphere, crucial regional ecosystems—and
conceivably the global ecosystem as a whole—could be pushed
further in the direction of the Ω phase, with possible risks of
(adverse) critical transitions (29, 30–33).
The conventional energy system, which appears to be in its
characteristically rigid conservation phase (28), expands its op-
erating space through new growth of its existing technologies in
developing countries. Thus, as deeper and longer-term invest-
ments are made, the conventional energy system becomes less
and less ﬂexible, i.e., unable, to adopt energy technologies that
deviate from the usual business models in the industry. For in-
stance, in the last decade China reached a construction speed at
which it added the equivalent of one (1 GW) coal-ﬁred plant per
week so that in 2012 69% of the total operating coal-ﬁred plants
was younger than 10 y (34, 35), with write-off periods of more
than 30 y. These investments, in turn, increase the conventional
energy system’s inﬂuence on and connection with the environ-
mental system. Because of this increasing connectivity, the
feedbacks from the environmental system, such as rising plane-
tary mean temperature and sea levels, also grow heavily and
inevitably. However, these feedbacks to the conventional and the
ﬁnancial system are blocked (or delayed) by the lack of effective
treaties responding to the problems caused by the conventional
energy system, the absence of shareholder liability (the solid-
dashed arrows from the environmental system to the conven-
tional and ﬁnancial system in Fig. 5), and the relegation of the
problems to the realm of ‘externalities’ by economic theory.
The ﬁnancial system, which, like the conventional energy
system, focuses on economic efﬁciency, has exported a sub-
stantial portion of its problems to national states (which it
evaluates, in turn, through its privately ﬁnanced credit rating
institutions) and appears—notwithstanding a ﬁnancial crisis—to
be at the peak period of its power (36). The system itself has not
yet experienced a collapse, i.e. a release phase; its core processes
and institutions, reﬂecting a high degree of connectedness, were
barely affected by the ﬁnancial crisis, and its accumulation of
ﬁnancial resources and power is still untamed (i.e., retains high
potential). While the ﬁnancial system operates in its conserva-
tion phase, and, like the conventional energy system, also is
driven by, among other factors, conventional (path-dependent)
decisions (Hebb’s law, shown in Fig. 5 by the arrows from
managers’ conservative decisions to the conventional energy
system and the ﬁnancial energy system), it does not incur the
negative consequences of its conventional energy and technology
investments because the shareholder construction (with absence
of liability for the shareholder) also safeguards the ﬁnancial
system (e.g., capital investment funds that push conventional
energy companies to maintain their proﬁtability by continuing
their existing fossil focused business model).
The nascent alternative energy system now appears to be in
transition between a late-reorganization phase and an early-ex-
ploitation phase: Networks of consumers and suppliers and hard-
ware infrastructures still need to crystallize and become coherent
(i.e., they now exhibit low connectedness), and efﬁciency is still
relatively low compared with the conventional energy system. As
far as the production processes and the technology itself are con-
cerned, not enough outputs and impacts are created to disturb the
conventional energy system. Even though the implementation of
alternative energy technology is absolutely necessary to combat
the problems mentioned above, it is clear that, if that alternative
system grows, becomes more coherent, and gains critical mass, its
negative inﬂuence on and disturbance of the environmental sys-
tem may be bigger than now anticipated. The history of technol-
ogy substitution is full of pertinent lessons: e.g., the replacement
of the horse and carriage, which was responsible for massive
manure on city streets, by the automobile. The environmental
problems caused by the latter are now about to overwhelm entire
societies.
To sum up, the conventional energy system with its supercrit-
ical mass, facilitated by the ﬁnancial system, expands, increasing
its inﬂuence on the environmental system. The alternative energy
system, still lacking critical mass, also appears to expand but does
so very slowly, hindered by the presence of the “Success to the
Successful” pattern (shown by the arrow from the conventional to
the alternative energy system in Fig. 5). The alternative energy
system does not yet have the power to replace the conventional
energy system or to disrupt the conventional energy system’s tight
and damaging relationship with the environmental system (i.e.,
the climate and the earth’s various ecosystems).
Kondratiev Cycles and the Adaptive Cycle
As explained above, as far as the various market shares of the
important primary energy-supply sources are concerned, the de-
velopment of the world energy system appears to be in a state of
stagnation and rigidity. Stasis in the energy system is rare and
actually did not occur in the period from the beginning of the ﬁrst
Industrial Revolution until the 1970s. In former times the tech-
nologies dominating the energy system would have shown the
dynamics of saturation and change, leading to substitution at
a fast rate (37, 38). Fig. 6 displays the conspicuous inertia of the
relative market shares of the traditional biomass fuels (indicated
in brown), coal (in gray), and the modern energy forms such as
oil, gas, and electricity (in red) that emerges in the early 1970s.
The replacement of the dominant energy technology usually
begins in the saturation phase of its diffusion process, which
coincides with the upper turning point of the corresponding
economic Kondratiev long-wave. This stage can be likened to the
late conservation release (K–Ω) phase of the adaptive cycle (39).
The dominant technology saturates the maturing energy system,
the demand for its products reaches its limits, its environmental
ﬁt worsens, and eventually the associated techno-economic
paradigm meets its boundaries of societal acceptance (37). As
can be seen in Fig. 6, in contrast to the preceding 120 y in which
coal replaced wood and then modern fuels (predominantly oil)
replaced coal, there currently is no development in the energy
system that suggests any collapse of the incumbents’ market
shares (8, 9). The apparent slowing of the dynamics may be re-
lated to incipient critical transitions and their early warning sig-
nals, because the fundamental reduction of dynamics of change
in a system (e.g., eigenvalue approaching zero) is a typical in-
dicator of a possible upcoming catastrophic state shift (31, 40,
41); however, that interesting topic is beyond the scope of
this paper.
Some previous Kondratiev cycles and the industrial revolutions
associated with them disturbed the existing dominant pattern of
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the generation and use of energy and resulted in the replacement
of the previously dominant energy technology [e.g., the steam-
technology paradigm was replaced by the oil-based–technology
paradigm (42)]. However, in the latest Kondratiev revolution [i.e.,
the technological breakthrough of information technology (IT)],
no such challenging of the existing energy-technology structure
appears to have occurred. Indeed, the IT revolution may have
reinforced rather than disturbed the existing patterns of energy
production and use. Software and computers provide the in-
cumbent power and fuel industries with the tools to improve their
technologies and make them more efﬁcient than competing
schemes. The same tools are available to the alternative energy
technologies, of course, but to a lesser extent, because they cannot
afford so much investment. Thus, the IT wave appears to have
had a considerable smothering effect on the replacement of the
dominant technology in the energy system, because the imple-
mentation ripples from that wave did not require or enforce
a fundamental change in the conventional patterns of the energy
business but rather reinforced them. However, once the alterna-
tive energy technologies accumulate critical mass by attracting
ﬁnancial capital and market penetration, that smothering effect
will evaporate, because the alternative system will be able to make
deep IT investments to optimize their production processes.
Although the process of energy technology substitution halted
and moved into an apparent phase of stasis some decades ago,
the Kondratiev dynamics of macro-socioeconomic development
did not. The IT revolution eventually turned into an IT bubble
that burst and hit the global ﬁnancial system. The occurrence and
timing of the current ﬁnancial crisis period, similar to the release
(Ω) phase of the adaptive cycle (26), matches the pattern of
Kondratiev periodicity (23, 42). The crisis period starting around
the turn of the millennium certainly is not over yet and opens
opportunities to implement fundamental changes in our socio-
economic structures, because systems innovations tend to be
children of crises.
The history of these technological revolutions tells us that the
power of ﬁnancial institutions is diminished temporarily during
a deep crisis, making it much easier to pass and implement new
regulations and laws in such a period (23). Although the current
ﬁnancial turmoil is not caused by or related directly to energy
generation and consumption problems, the powerful conven-
tional energy system is still in its detrimental conservation phase,
as discussed above. Thus, this particular time and situation may
be used to create new regulations that can prevent or combat
full-blown crises in the environmental system, the energy system,
and—beyond this paper’s scope—the world food system (because
the energy and food systems are intimately connected by the
growing world population, among other factors). So, one rather
serious crisis may help mitigate several more disastrous ones.
The analysis and the subsequent suggestion for intervention
that we provide in the last section, although apparently appli-
cable to all crises, are limited to the current ﬁnancial crisis and to
the explanation of the energy system’s rigidity. The suggestion is
intended to start a discussion about establishing a structure for
self-inﬂicted, small, systems-level crises via permanent feedback
in order (i) to shorten the often damaging late-conservation
phase of the dominant subsystem (in this case, the conventional
energy system) and (ii) to prevent an unsustainably delayed
growth (r–K) phase of competing smaller systems (in this case,
the alternative energy system). Accomplishing these goals entails
an even greater beneﬁt: an increase in the resilience of the whole
system and the prevention of a release phase (collapse) on
a systems-wide level from which the entire complex or some of
its vital components might not recover to a life-sustaining regime
[i.e.; the so-called “critical transition” (29)].
In addition to the change-impeding elements we discussed
above, the role of shareholders, who naturally focus on a con-
stant and predictable ﬂow of short-term proﬁts and on efﬁciency,
makes it difﬁcult to shift toward an energy system dominated by
alternative energy, because new technologies demand invest-
ments for which returns are uncertain and initially never are
more efﬁcient than fully developed technologies. The share-
holders’ role has two aspects: the shareholders’ increased power
and their general lack of responsibility because of the absence
of liability.
Increased Power for Shareholders
Since the early 1990s there has been a gradual shift of power in
corporate governance, particularly in Europe, away from cor-
porate boards and toward shareholders. In many countries the
legal structures of corporate law protecting companies from
hostile takeovers have been widely criticized (43–45), and regu-
lations have come into effect changing corporate law to give
shareholders the power to have anti-takeover measures rescin-
ded under certain conditions (e.g., the 13th Directive 2004/25/
EC on takeover bids). Regulators and companies also have been
pressured to abandon the two-tier structure, common in large
corporations with continental European legal roots [Rhine
Capitalism; see Albert (46)], under which shareholders cannot
Fig. 6. Structural changes in world primary energy supply, 1850–2025. (Image courtesy of ref. 9).
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appoint or dismiss the board, and to move to the Anglo-Saxon
one-tier structure that grants shareholders those powers (47, 48).
This trend toward the abolition of anti-takeover measures was
ﬁred by the frenzy over stock trading, particularly IT-related stocks,
during which proﬁts could be generated virtually instantaneously.
With the advent of the IT revolution, in many Western economies
ﬁnancial institutions (e.g., banks, ﬁnancial investors, and stock
markets) heavily involved in trading IT stock became more pow-
erful (42). They saw anti-takeover measures as a bar to trading and
an undesirable limitation of their power. Because the corporate
boards of poorly performing companies could not be replaced in-
stantly, these measures were said to reduce companies’ ﬁnancial
value and the value of their stock.
The trend toward greater shareholder control also was fueled
by scandals taking place in corporations (e.g., Enron in the United
States and Ahold in the Netherlands). In both cases the company
management (or its gatekeepers, such as auditors, analysts, debt-
rating agencies, and attorneys) were mainly held responsible for
the ﬁnancial disasters (49–54). In the Enron case, in particular,
the consequences were dire, because many former employees lost
their pension savings. Lawmakers responded not only by making
anti-takeover measures harder to implement but also by passing
laws requiring greater transparency and accountability in corpo-
rate governance so that no one, including board members, could
shirk their responsibilities. An example was the 2002 Sarbanes-
Oxley Act in the United States, which, because it is applicable to
all companies doing business with United States companies, has
had a worldwide effect. Soon other countries followed suit.
However, the role of shareholders and the pressure put on cor-
porate boards by shareholders and stock markets to generate
massive proﬁts were not discussed publicly.
Thus, in the last two decades, while the problems generated by
the energy system became more visible to the general public and
received political and legal attention expressed through efforts to
set up international treaties to combat climate change, share-
holders, with their focus on short-term interests and predominantly
maintaining and renewing investments in conventional energy in
lieu of alternative-energy investments (9), accrued more power.
We now discuss the shareholder position and provide a suggestion
that may make both the shareholder position and, as a conse-
quence, the energy system as a whole more sustainable.
Lack of Liability and Changing the Rules of the Game
As discussed above, the present lingering ﬁnancial-economic crisis
probably is a time at which reform measures to create a genuinely
sustainable business environment may stand a chance of being
implemented. If so, then, in addition to international treaty ini-
tiatives to curb environmental problems such as CO2 emissions, the
introduction of an appropriate and powerful endogenous mecha-
nism is advisable in both the energy system and the ﬁnancial system.
The mechanism we suggest would cause the actors and institutions
playing a key role in energy-technology investments and the gov-
ernments that subsidize public authorities (such as utilities) to
counteract the detrimental consequences of both unlimited non-
linear growth and rigidity and to move away from that destructive
path. The lack of such a mechanism has been a core problem since
the ﬁrst Industrial Revolution. For an explanation of this deﬁciency
and of how to remove it, we need to consider the backbone of
corporate law, i.e., the structure and the origin of the corporation.
The basic structure of a corporation or company, private or public,
involves the setting up of a legal vehicle with legal personality,
through and on behalf of which the directors (and sometimes other
employees) can act. The directors normally cannot be held person-
ally liable for their actions or omissions on behalf of the company.
Moving a step further into corporate law, we observe that
a company is owned by its shareholders. If the shareholders have
established the company, they normally must pay a ﬁxed amount
of capital (set by national regulation) that eventually must be
provided in full. The purpose of this capital is to serve as minimal
insurance for the company creditors. If shareholders have not
established the company themselves, they generally must pay
a portion of the value of the company to acquire share ownership.
Thus, the shareholders have a limited liability: Their ﬁnancial risk
extends only to the amount they paid for their shares if the
company ceases operating. Like the company directors, share-
holders normally cannot be held personally liable for the actions
taken or omitted by the company.[In rare and very speciﬁc cases,
the shareholders (or the directors) of the company can be held
liable (e.g., if a company was established for fraudulent pur-
poses); in such cases one speaks of “lifting” or “piercing the
corporate veil. This liability occurs particularly in the case of
small companies (55).]
As company owners, shareholders can appoint, or inﬂuence the
appointment of, the directors (now usually called “chief executive
ofﬁcers,” CEOs), who, following agency theory, are agents of those
shareholders and are obliged to observe their ﬁduciary duties,
taking care of the interests of the shareholders. The shareholders
also must be consulted if the directors plan to change the structure
or strategy of the company in any signiﬁcant way. Through voting
power the shareholders thus have signiﬁcant inﬂuence on the
company’s actions. Thus shareholders take ﬁnancial risks by paying
for shares and in return get power in the form of rights conveying
inﬂuence—a balanced and legally objective system.
Or so the general legal-economic story goes. However, lacking
from this narrative is the fact that shareholders not only risk
losing their investment but also “risk” increasing the value of that
investment. These risks are then in economic balance. As we saw
above, however, such an equilibrium state does not exist in the
corporate legal realm: The jurisdictional counterweight of share-
holder’s rights, i.e., shareholder’s obligations and liabilities (apart
from the obligation to pay for acquiring share ownership and
speciﬁc cases in which the corporate veil is lifted) generally does
not exist. In other words, what often is considered a well-balanced
legal-ﬁnancial construction has an asymmetric and unbalanced
foundation.
The speciﬁc legal-ﬁnancial framework thus grants sweeping
power to the shareholders, who invest in, inﬂuence, and de-
termine (through the pressure of the demand for immediate
proﬁts) the course of the company but actively blocks feedback
to the stockholders from any system that is or may be affected by
the company’s decisions and actions. In other words: the positive
investment-feedback loop is facilitated, and potentially stabiliz-
ing feedback loops that could conﬁne unsustainable runaway
dynamics are blocked.
In this context, it is instructive to look at the origin of the ﬁrst
public corporation ever established (in 1602), the Vereenigde
Oostindische Compagnie (VOC, in English, the Dutch East In-
dia Company). Its owners neither wished nor expected to be
confronted with the legal consequences of the actions and
omissions of the economic entity in which they invested. In fact,
they were not supposed to bear these consequences—these were
colonial times. In an era when Europeans were discovering the
existence of entire continents, the world appeared to have an
endlessly receding horizon, and the indigenous people of the
colonies were not necessarily considered important, let alone
equal. In other words, when the shareholder company structure
was formed, there was little reason to take into account a ratio-
nale for stabilizing feedback mechanisms.
The parallels between the VOC period and current times
cannot be overlooked. Then and now, companies serve as legal
vehicles for generating immediate proﬁts for shareholders and
allowing investors to reap the beneﬁts of expansion (precious
spices such as pepper, nutmeg, and cloves from colonies in the
past; oil, coal, gas, and uranium from friendly powers at pres-
ent) without being confronted with the consequences of such
harvesting dynamics. This historical perspective alone should
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sufﬁce for reconsidering, at least, the assumption that the in-
ternational ﬁnancial make-up, with the structure of the share-
holder company as its backbone, is the perfect example of an
“unquestionable” system (56). It shows the expansion through time
of a legal structure, which came into being under very speciﬁc (co-
lonialism) and still open circumstances (i.e., the shareholder con-
struction was still new and adjustable, without path dependence).
What was logical and useful then is not necessarily logical and useful
now, and adjustability has been replaced by rigidity.
In the wider legal universe, ownership of any kind generally
encompasses not only entitlements but also liabilities: There are
property duties as well as property rights. A simple example is
house ownership: the owner is obliged to maintain his/her build-
ing so that it does not cause damage to others (e.g., a chimney
falling on a passer-by would constitute liability and enforce
compensational payments). However, as some argue, although
a house has no will of its own and is normally under the control of
its owner or tenant, the situation is different for companies. Even
though the shareholders own the company and inﬂuence deci-
sions concerning it, the directors or managers are assumed to
make judicious and independent decisions on its behalf. Follow-
ing this line of reasoning, however, the broader legal system
provides a helpful analogical remedy. In the case of the house
owner, even if the building is let to a third person (i.e., the house is
not under direct control of the owner), the proprietor normally
remains liable for damages such as those caused by the collapsing
chimney. If one owns an entity, one normally is responsible for the
consequences of events resulting from that ownership, however
remote or incomplete the control.
In contrast, if a modern company pollutes the environment,
the shareholder has no direct legal obligations and is not even
obliged to prevent the company’s management from polluting or
to mitigate the damage or to stop polluting completely. As a re-
sult of the absence of shareholders’ obligations, for a shareholder
the only economic consequences related to the operation of the
company are a chance of proﬁt and a risk of loss expressed in the
ﬁnancial value of shares and the amount of dividend the company
distributes.
For legal and logical consistency, and because the share-
holders strongly inﬂuence, if not fully determine, the strategy and
the operation of the business based on their rights, it seems ex-
pedient to oblige investors to exert their power in such a way that
the company does not cause damage to third parties or public
goods. Should these obligations not be met, liability should ensue
automatically. In other words a legal negative feedback loop
establishing shareholder liability should balance the share-
holders’ zest for unrestricted expansion (Fig. 5).
If such unlimited liability were established under general pre-
vailing norms of tort law, there are no grounds for assuming that
shareholder investment would be discouraged (excluding ﬁrms that
impose net costs on society) or for supposing that such liability would
create insurmountable obstacles to judicial administration (57).
As discussed above, shareholders’ power has increased in the
last decades as a result of various regulatory changes. Also, with
the help of novel IT facilities, the ﬁnancial markets and share-
holders now move trillions of dollars and Euros for investment
and disinvestment around the globe daily, just by clicking elec-
tronic mice (58, 59). In essence, although the shareholders have
become almost omnipotent, their responsibility for the actions of
the company they own has not caught up.
If we attempt to place this situation in a perspective unifying
the concepts of self-organization (cybernetics) theory (60, 61),
the adaptive cycle (26), panarchical dimensions (27), and process
ecology (62), we observe the following. If a system has reached
maturity (conservation or K phase) after an evolutionary com-
petitive battle that required emphasis on efﬁciency and the re-
moval of redundancy, it exhibits the propensity to become rigid
and powerless to respond to the changes in and needs of its
environment, entailing the risk that the system, its environment,
or both, will collapse. Information ﬂowing between the system
and its environment generally allow each to accommodate to the
other, increasing the resilience of the conglomerate of systems
(i.e., the whole system under consideration). In the conventional
energy system, corporate law, through the exclusion of liability,
precludes the feeding back of information from the environment
to company shareholders. Thus, this subsystem is prevented
from adapting to environmental signals. The in-built tragedy of
systems in their conservation phase follows rigorously from their
dominance, which implies both rigidity and destructiveness to
their context and thus, ﬁnally, to themselves. That tragedy can
be defused only by allowing moderating feedbacks between the
system and its context in the spirit of coexistence. Younger
subsystems normally are much smaller and more adaptive and
therefore less destructive toward their environment. Genuine
shareholder liability would solve this dilemma even for a mature
corporation: If the company does not cause major damage, its
shareholders will have nothing to fear—and vice versa.
Let us emphasize that successful systems (companies or entire
industries) do not necessarily behave in ways that are damaging
to their environment. However, as they continually grow, their
adaptive capacities generally decrease, and the damage they may
inﬂict on their environment escalates. This propensity implies
that introducing shareholder liability may discourage investment
in certain companies or industries at an earlier point in their
evolution than at present, i.e., as soon as damaging effects be-
come foreseeable or even observable. Today, the underlying
structural mismatch between corporations and their environment
often becomes visible only when companies run out of economic
reasons for existence, i.e., when the endgame is played.
The mismatch in question is especially conspicuous in the en-
ergy system and its speciﬁc relationship between the shareholders’
legal position and the production of negative side-effects (e.g.,
through deep-sea or polar drilling for oil). The relationship is
damage-sustaining in that (i) it conserves capital ﬂows and vested
interests in industries that are proven to be damaging and (ii)
liability is expressly excluded. It also is damage-increasing by fa-
cilitating additional/new capital ﬂows into unsustainable in-
dustries. Or, to put it in systems dynamics terms, shareholder
power and production of negative side-effects by the energy sys-
tem are positively related. This relationship has its origin in the
seemingly neutral and objective system of corporate law applied
worldwide. To reduce the problems inherent in the energy system,
reconﬁguring this relationship is essential.
As long as no negative feedback is allowed to reach and affect
shareholders, they will neither reallocate their investments nor
move the management of the company that they own away from
the drive for constant and immediate proﬁts and to alternative
purposes. For example, shortly after the nuclear disaster at the
Fukushima Daiichi plant of Tokyo Electric Power Company Inc.,
several governments and investors announced that they would
continue to fund the development of atomic energy [see, for
example, Japan’s expression of commitment to nuclear power
(63)]. Note also that on April 20, 2011, 1 y after the explosion at
the Deepwater Horizon platform in the Gulf of Mexico, the New
York Stock Exchange value of British Petroleum reached again
$45.91 per share, a recovery of more than 69% after its low of
$27.07 per share on June 25, 2010 (64). Accidental developments
evidently do not have system-transforming power by themselves.
However, if shareholders had clear-cut liabilities and had to
consider these responsibilities in all their activities, would there
still be massive investments in CO2-producing and polluting coal-
ﬁred power plants or, indeed, in any technologies that clearly
create extensive damage? By restoring the balance of rights and
obligations in the currently asymmetrical legal framework for
corporations, the “Success to the Successful” pattern can be
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disturbed creatively, and shareholders will have good reasons
to reallocate their investments to more sustainable ventures.
Given the central position of corporate law in the ﬁnancial
system and the energy system, policymakers who strive to
break away from destructive energy business-as-usual practices
might ﬁnd it worthwhile to address the fundamental asymme-
tries noted in this paper. Modiﬁcation of the corporate law
system—in addition to the creation of laws prohibiting dam-
aging energy production and consumption—appears to
be unavoidable.
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